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CONFIDENTIALITY OF
ECCLESIASTICAL
RECORDSt
REVEREND EDWARD DILLON,

J.C.D.*

Two fundamental factors govern the confidentiality of ecclesiastical
records. They are the nature of the information involved and the manner
in which it is obtained. Thus, confessional matter, by its nature, is confidential. Further, since it involves information obtained under the seal of
the Sacrament, it may never be divulged.'
The cloak of confidentiality spread to other communications. Canon
1548, section 2 exempts from any obligation of testifying in an ecclesiastical trial the following persons: "clerics, in regard to whatever was made
known to them in connection with their sacred ministry; civil officials,
doctors, obstetricians, advocates, notaries and others who are bound to
professional secrecy, even by reason of advice rendered, as regards matters subject to this secrecy." A party to a case could release such a person
from the obligation of confidentiality, but there are exceptions, the most
significant of which is the seal of confession.2 This exemption is extended
t The portion of this presentation which deals with the confidentiality of Tribunal records
is drawn almost exclusively from a presentation by the same author to the 45th Annual
Convention of the Canon Law Society of America held in San Francisco, Cal., in October,
1983. It will appear in the Proceedings of that convention to be published this spring and is
under copyright by the Canon Law Society of America. The author is indebted to that
Society for permission to use the material in this presentation.
The Code of Canon Law was promulgated in 1983 in Latin. A translation of the Code
was published by the Canon Law Society of America, with the permission of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Holy See. The translation contains both the Latin
text and an English translation. All quotations of canons in this presentation are given in
English and are taken from that translation.
* Province of Atlanta, Georgia Officialis, Court of Appeals.
1983 CODE c.983, § 1: "The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a
confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason." Id. Under the provision of 1983 CODE c.1550, § 2, a confessor is incapable in law of
being a witness regarding information obtained through the confessional.
Id. at c.1550, § 2: The following are considered incapable [of testifying]: "2. priests as
regards everything which has become known to them by reason of sacramental confession,
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to "persons who fear that infamy, dangerous vexations or other serious
evils will happen to themselves, or their spouse, or persons related to
''
them by consanguinity or affinity, as a result of their testimony. 1
Some very specific regulations govern the confidentiality of information gathered in a Tribunal proceeding. The treatment of other records is,
in general, less specific. Accordingly, for the purposes of this treatment, it
seems appropriate to follow a similar distinction, that is, between Tribunal records and other types of records.
Each diocese is required to maintain an archive. This, by definition,
is a "safe place" or depository for records and is under the care of a chancellor, whose principal task is to "see to it that the acts of the curia are
gathered, arranged and safeguarded. . . ."' This depository is to be
locked 5 and there are restrictions as to who may have access to these documents or remove them from the archive.' However, that does not necessarily imply that all documents in the archive are completely confidential.
Information pertaining to administrative decisions in matters, for example, such as property, building and the like may not be divulged by
members of the curia,7 but there is no inherent reason why the Bishop
could not do so. The Bishop is the one who establishes the norm of secrecy to be observed in general matters by the diocesan staff.8 However,
that norm (or norms) establishes only an obligation for the curial staff
and does not necessarily affect the basic nature of the document(s) in
question. Thus, if the basic document is accessible, it may be obtained by
anyone to whom the law gives this right, or more accurately, by anyone
whom the law does not deprive of this right, even though the curial staff
even if the penitent request their manifestation; moreover, whatever has been heard, by
anyone or in any way on the occasion of confession cannot be accepted as even an indication
of the truth." Id.
' Id. at c.1548, § 2(2): ITihe following are exempted from the obligation to answer: "2. persons who fear that infamy, dangerous vexations or other serious evils will happen to themselves, or their spouse, or persons related to them by consanguinity or affinity, as a result of
their testimony. Id.
IId. at c.482, § 1: "In every curia, a chancellor is to be appointed whose principal task is,
unless particular law determines otherwise, to see to it that the acts of the curia are gathered, arranged and safeguarded in the archive of the curia." Id.
' Id. at c.487, § 1: "It is necessary that the archive be locked and that only the bishop and
the chancellor have a key to it; ....
" Id.
' Id. "[N]o one may [e]licitly enter it without the permission either of the bishop or of both
the moderator of the curia and the chancellor." Id. 1983 CODE c.488 provides: "It is not
permitted to remove documents from the archives, except for a brief time only and with the
consent either of the bishop or of both the moderator of the curia and the chancellor." Id.
' Id. at c.471: All persons who are admitted to offices within the curia must: "2. observe secrecy within the limits and according to the manner determined by law or by the
bishop." Id.
6 Id.
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could not ordinarily divulge the information it contains.
One of the bases of confidentiality is the right to privacy, now formally recognized in ecclesiastical statutory law for the first time.9 But
even that right to privacy is not paramount. The so-called secret marriage
is a good example.10 The obligation to maintain secrecy about such a marriage ceases by law if, in the judgment of the local Ordinary, serious scandal or serious harm to the sanctity of marriage would arise if secrecy is
preserved." The right to privacy, therefore, must be balanced against any
other 1) rights which may come into play in the individual case; and 2)
more importantly, against the greater good of the broader community;
and 3) the promotion of the ultimate mission of the Church.
Canon 487, section 2 provides that an interested party, personally or
through an agent, may obtain an authentic copy or photocopy of documents which are public by their nature and which pertain to the status of
2
that person.1
The concept "public by nature" is not specifically defined in the
Code. Since it is used in reference to documents, it could well be argued
that it refers to public ecclesiastical documents. These are documents
which "official persons have drawn up in the exercise of their function in
the Church, after having observed the formalities prescribed by law."'
The Code of 1917 listed some of the principal public ecclesiastical
documents: acts of the Pope, of the Roman Curia and of Ordinaries, if the
acts were issued in the exercise of their office and in authentic form; instruments made by ecclesiastical notaries; judicial ecclesiastical records;
records of baptism, confirmation, ordination, religious profession, marriage and death which are preserved in the Curia or the parish or the
religious organization; also written attestations, taken from the said
I Id.

at c.220: "No one is permitted to damage unlawfully the good reputation which another person enjoys nor to violate the right of another person to protect his or her own
privacy." Id.
10 Id. at c.1130: "For a serious and urgent reason the local ordinary can permit a marriage to
be celebrated secretly." Id. 1983 CODE c.1131 provides: "The permission to celebrate a marriage secretly also includes: "1. permission that the pre-matrimonial investigation be made
secretly; 2. the obligation that secrecy concerning the marriage be observed by the local
ordinary, the assisting minister, the witnesses and the spouses." Id.
"' Id.
at c.1132: "The obligation to observe secrecy ... ceases on the part of the local ordinary if serious scandal or serious harm to the sanctity of marriage is threatened by observing the secret and this is to be made known to the parties before the celebration of the
marriage." Id.
Is Id. at c.487, § 2: "It is a right of interested parties to obtain personally or through their
proxy an authentic written copy or a photocopy of documents which are public by their
nature and which pertain to the status of such persons." Id.
3 Id. at c.1540, § 1: "Public ecclesiastical documents are those which official persons have
drawn up in the exercise of their function in the Church, after having observed the formalities prescribed by law." d.
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records, made by pastors, or Ordinaries or ecclesiastical notaries, and authentic copies of them.14
The revised Code parallels the comparable canons in the 1917 Code.
Therefore, it is to be interpreted in accordance with the interpretations
applied to the canons of the 1917 Code. The list is not exhaustive because
it describes only the principal public ecclesiastical documents. However,
it provides insight as to what is to be considered a public ecclesiastical
document.
The document has to be based on some official action and be a recording of the information pertaining to that action, for example, baptism
or ordination, or a decree establishing a parish. It always involves the
action of some authority in the Church, whether that be the Pope, an
Ordinary, an ecclesiastical notary, a judge, or a pastor. Furthermore, the
term "public ecclesiastical document" pertains in concept more to the
weight of authority the document carries as an instrument of proof than
it does to general accessibility of the document. This is seen clearly in the
case of records pertaining to judicial actions, for example, marriage cases.
These are public ecclesiastical documents, but are not publicly accessible
even though the information pertains to the status of a person, is provable in the external forum, and by law there is a defined element of publication required for such information. Consequently, the access provided
in Canon 487, section 2, is not absolute.
In the first place, Canon 487, section 2 refers only to public ecclesiastical documents. In the second place, the right of access to the document
is to be interpreted in light of two other factors: 1) whether there is a
specific statutory obligation of secrecy; and 2) the relationship to the information of the person who seeks access. These considerations must be
coupled with the more general considerations mentioned above regarding
the right to privacy, the greater good of the broader community, and the
welfare of the Church's mission as a whole. With these general principles
in mind, a review of some specific situations mentioned in the Code can

"

1917 CODE c.1813, § 1:
The principal public ecclesiastical documents are:
1) acts of the Supreme Pontiff, of the Roman Curia and of Ordinaries, if the acts
were issued in the exercise of their office and in authentic form; also authentic
attestations concerning these acts made by the aforesaid persons or their
notaries:
2) instruments made by ecclesiastical notaries;
3) judicial ecclesiastical records;
4) records of baptism, confirmation, ordination, religious profession, marriage, and
death, which are preserved in the Curia, or the parish, or the religious organization; also written attestations taken from the said records made by pastors, or
Ordinaries, or ecclesiastical notaries, and authentic copies of them.

ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS

be undertaken.
Canon 221, section 1 recognizes the right of all the Christian faithful
to vindicate and defend their rights in Church law before a competent
ecclesiastical court. 15 This implies a right to everything necessary to so
vindicate and defend their rights and includes access to the information
necessary to make their case. The right of access could not be proposed as
an absolute one since, in light of the principles mentioned above, there
could be restrictions applicable in a given case. Nonetheless, it establishes
a general principle that the person has a right of access unless in a particular case some restriction must be placed for a specific purpose. Such a
denial would be made either in a judicial or an administrative fashion,
more commonly the latter. In either case, it must be made in writing,"6 it
must be interpreted strictly," and it must give the reasons on which it is
based."s

A cloak of secrecy is specifically established for information acquired
in the process for the appointment of bishops. Canon 377, section 3 establishes, in broad outline, the inquiry that precedes the selection of individuals whose names are proposed to the Apostolic See for appointment to
episcopal office. It decrees that the Apostolic legate may obtain opinions
on the suitability of a candidate, and these are given and kept in
secrecy. 9
In addition to the regular archive of the diocese, there is also a secret
archive. This contains documents which are to be kept secret so that they
"5 Id. 1983 CODE c.221, § 1: "The Christian faithful can legitimately vindicate and defend
the rights which they enjoy in the Church before a competent ecclesiastical court in accord
with the norm of law." Id.
16 1983 CODE c.37: "An administrative act which deals with the external forum is to be set
forth in writing ..
" Id.
Id. at c.36, § 1:
An administrative act is to be understood in accord with the proper meaning of the
words and the common usage of speech. In a doubtful situation administrative acts
are subject to a broad interpretation except for the following administrative acts
which are subject to a strict interpretation: those dealing with lawsuits, those threatening or inflicting penalties, those which restrict the rights of a person, those which
injure the acquired rights of others, or those which benefit private individuals and are
contrary to the law.

Id.
11Id. at c.51: "A decree should be issued in writing, giving, in the case of a decision, the
reasons which prompted it, at least in a summary fashion." Id.
Id. at c.377, § 3:
[Mloreover, the pontifical legate is to hear some members of the college of consultors
and of the cathedral chapter, and if he judges it expedient, he shall also obtain, individually and in secret, the opinion of other members of the secular and religious
clergy as well as of the laity who are outstanding for their wisdom.
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can be "protected most securely. ' 20 It is accessible only to the Bishop. He
alone may have the key.2 1 When the See is vacant, the secret archive may
22
be opened by the diocesan administrator only in a case of true necessity.
Further, a document may not be removed from the secret archive except
as provided by law.23 In fact, the only time a document
may be removed
24
is so that it may be destroyed as provided by law.
Only the most exceptional type of documents are placed in the secret
archive.25 Ordinarily, they would pertain to criminal trials. An individual
bishop might choose in a given case to place other documents or information in the secret archive so as to lessen or prevent the possibility of scandal or the possibility of defamation of an individual's good name. However, that course could legitimately be taken only in unusual
circumstances, and all the rules governing the secret archives would then
apply.
Canon 645 governs admission to the novitiate of a religious institute.
It stipulates the nature of the investigation which precedes admission. It
goes on to provide that if, in the opinion of a superior, other information
is needed, it can be obtained under an obligation of secrecy.26' That obligation is two-fold. It obliges the person who gives the information. More
importantly, it obliges the superior who obtained it. Whether the information is used in the decision-making process is immaterial to its confidentiality. In a case, therefore, where an individual, whose request for
admission to a novitiate was denied, petitions access to such a record, for
example, for the purpose of reviewing the information on which the decision was made, the superior would have no choice in law but to deny the
request.
A religious superior who wishes to dismiss a member of the Institute
for whatever reason may do so only with the support of the Institute's
Id. at c.489, § 1: "There is also to be a secret archive in the diocesan curia or at least a
safe or file in the ordinary archive, completely closed and locked which cannot be removed
from the place, and in which documents to be kept secret are to be protected most securely." Id.
" Id. at c.490, § 1: "Only the bishop may have the key to the secret archive." Id.
"1 Id. at § 2: "When the see is vacant the secret archive or safe is not to be opened, except
in a case of true necessity by the diocesan administrator himself." Id.
11 Id.
at § 3: "Documents are not to be removed from the secret archive or safe." Id.
24 Id.
at c.489, § 2: "Every year documents of criminal cases are to be destroyed in matters
of morals in which the criminal has died or in which ten years have passed since the condemnatory sentence; but a brief summary of the case with the text of the definitive sentence
is to be retained. Id.
15 1983 CODE c.1082 provides that a marriage dispensation for the internal forum is kept in
the secret archive. Such a dispensation is akin to, and might even have taken place in, the
internal sacramental forum, that is, confession.
" Id. at c.645, § 3: "If it appears necessary superiors can ask for other information, even
with the obligation of secrecy." Id.
10
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council. The vote is by secret ballot.17 Secrecy applies, though, only to the
ballots themselves, that is, to the identity of the individual who cast the
particular ballot. The process which precedes it clearly requires that the
individual have access to all records pertaining to the case, whether that
be information about the case or background information which might
affect the individual's defense. s
This right of access is a fairly general one. Certainly it applies to all
situations in which a person is obliged to mount a defense against accusations or administrative or judicial actions. Only in the rarest of cases
could access to such information be denied without thereby jeopardizing
the validity of the action itself. This issue will emerge in greater clarity
when treating the confidentiality of Tribunal records.
There are two other areas in the Code which provide some guidance.
Canon 1582 permits a judge access2 9to any place or thing when he considers this necessary to settle a case.

The canon could be interpreted as applying to records in general
since the words used are very broad. Further, there is built into the procedural law itself a safeguard of secrecy imposed on the judge and others
who participate in a judicial proceeding, the purpose of which is to protect the parties and their good names, or to avoid discord, scandal or
"some other similar disadvantage."30
Id. at c.699, § 1: "With the council, which must have at least four members for validity,
the supreme moderator is to proceed collegially to the careful weighing of the proofs, arguments and defenses; if it has been so decided by a secret ballot, the supreme moderator is to
issue the decree of dismissal ... " Id.
U Id.
at c.697:
[I]f the major superior, after having heard the council, believes the process of dismissal is to be begun:
1.
..
2. the major superior is to warn the member in writing or before two witnesses with
an explicit threat of subsequent dismissal unless the member reforms, the cause
of the dismissal is to be clearly indicated and the member is to be given the full
opportunity of self-defense; ..
Id.
2" Id. at c.1582: "If in order to settle a case the judge considers it opportune to have access
to a given place or to inspect something, this should be specified in a decree which describes
in summary fashion those elements which must be exhibited at the access, after hearing the
parties." Id.
SOId. at c.1455
1. Judges and tribunal personnel are always bound to secrecy of office in a penal case;
they are also thus bound in a contentious case if the parties may be harmed by the
revelation of some procedural act.
2. . ..
3. Moreover, as often as the nature of a case or the proofs is such that the reputation
of others is endangered by divulging the acts or proofs, or an opportunity for discord
is provided or scandal or some other similar disadvantage might arise, the judge can
27
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But a party to a case also has a defense against such an action by a
judge in regard to records.31 No one is obliged to exhibit documents (or
records) which cannot be communicated without risk that infamy, dangerous vexations or other serious evils will happen to themselves, or their
spouse, or persons related to them by consanguinity or affinity. 2 The
right of denial covers documents which are common to both parties, and
even though other safeguards against possible evil consequences are built
into the law, and despite what might seem to be a violation of the right of
defense which the other party to the case should enjoy. It seems that the
right to privacy is paramount in this situation and supersedes even the
right of defense.
Such is the case when the document is common to both parties. A
fortiori applies, and perhaps with even more vigor, when a document or
record is not common to both parties, but rather pertains only to one of
the parties, for example, a personnel record. In the absence of any authentic interpretation or authoritative jurisprudence, it seems that the
one who makes the judgment on whether fear of such evil is present is the
one whose record it is, rather than a judge or the one who might, in fact,
have physical possession of the record.
The question of divulgence of information acquired by the Tribunal
in investigating a marriage arises at a number of points in the formal
process. The underlying concern is always the right of defense. As a concept, that applies not just to the respondent's right of defending against
allegations made by the petitioner, but also to the petitioner's right of
pursuing the claim made in the petition, to the respondent's right either
to oppose or support the claim made in that petition, and to the Defender
of the Bond's right to oppose the claim. Sequentially, the first point at
which this issue arises is at the very beginning of the process.
The revised Code states that by the decree which admits the petition,
the judge must call or cite the other party for the contestatio litis."3 That
decree of citation must be communicated to the respondent as soon as
bind the witnesses, the experts, the parties and their advocates or proxies by oath to
observe secrecy.

Id.
"' Id. at c.1545: "The judge can order that a document which is common to both parties be
exhibited in the process." Id.
32 Id.
at c.1546, § 1: "Even if documents are common, no one is obliged to exhibit those
which cannot be communicated without risk of harm in accordance with the norm of can.
1548, § 2, n.2, or without risk of violating the obligation to observe secrecy." Id.
'1 Id. at c.1507, § 1: "In the decree which accepts the libellus of the petitioner the judge or
president must either call into court or cite the other parties for the joinder of issues. .. ."
Id. "Libellus" is a standard canonical term used for the petition which introduces the case.

Id.
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possible,"4 and if it is not done, the process is null. 35 Furthermore, the
petition must be made available to the other party, either as an attachment to the citation or by communication after the other party's judicial
deposition. 8
The general principle is that the respondent must have access to the
information necessary to present an adequate defense. But, while this is a
general principle, it is not an absolute one. Access to information is not so
essential a right that any restriction would irreparably damage the right
of defense. The judge has discretionary power37 to withhold the information contained in the petition until after judicial deposition by the respondent. Consequently, the specific allegations made by the petitioner
are not necessarily known to the respondent at the time of the contestatio litis. The law demands that this be done only for grave cause. But the
absence of this information does not essentially destroy the right of defense, at least at this stage of the process, so it can be omitted without
the entire process being invalid. Thus, an exception to complete divulgence is already established at the beginning of the process.
The next procedural point at which a person other than an official of
the court has access to the information gathered is treated in Canon 1678.
Representatives 8 of the parties have a right to be present at the examination of the parties, the witnesses and the experts.3 9 The parties do not
have any rights both because the canon does not mention them and because it specifically exempts the situation mentioned in Canon 1559. This
latter canon says the parties have no right to be present unless, in a case
involving the private good, the judge admits them.40 A marriage case al" Id. at c.1508, § 1: "The decree of citation to the trial must be forwarded immediately to
the respondent ..
" Id.
" Id. at c.1511: "If the citation has not been legitimately communicated, the acts of the
process are null ..... Id.
" Id. at c.1508, § 2: "The introductory libellus is to be joined to the citation unless for
serious reasons the judge determines that the libellus is not to be made known to the respondent before the latter makes a deposition during the trial." Id.
31 The only restriction is that he exercise it for a grave cause, and he is the only one who
determines whether such a case exists and in what it consists. See id.
'0 The word used is "patronis," which implies a function broader than that of advocate or
procurator considered singly.
39

1983 ConE c.1678,

§

1:

The defender of the bond, the advocates of the parties and the promoter of justice, if
intervening in the suit, have the right:
1. to be present at the examination of the parties, the witnesses and the experts,
with due regard for the prescription of can. 1559;
2. to inspect the judicial acts even though not published and to review the documents produced by the parties.

Id.
40 Id. at

c.1559: "The parties may not assist at the examination of witnesses unless the judge
believes that they must be admitted, especially when the matter concerns the private
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ways involves the public good, and the parties are never to be admitted to
the examination of the opponent, the witnesses, or the experts.41 In addition to this, the second part of Canon 1678 specifically excludes the parties from attending such sessions. Furthermore, the judge may also decide
that, because of the nature of the matter or of the person involved, the
deposition is to proceed in secret, excluding even the advocates and
4
procurators. 1
Prior to examination of the witnesses, the judge is to communicate
their names to the parties. 43 If he prudently believes that this cannot be
done without grave difficulty at this point, it may be done later, but
before the publication of the testimony.44 This is another dimension of
the right of defense. Its intent is that the parties will have an opportunity
to object to a witness and to lodge a petition for exclusion of a particular
4
witness, or witnesses. '
Canon 1554 of the revised Code is almost identical in tone and wording to Canon 1763 of the 1917 Code. 46 Article 123 of Provida Mater is
even closer to the revised Code in wording. 47 Following up on that was
article 130, which provided that if necessity demanded it,4 the judge or
auditor could bind the advocates and even the procurators4s under an
oath of secrecy. 50 Further, the judge could even go so far as to permit a
good.
Id.
" Id. at c.1678, § 2: "The parties cannot assist at the examination mentioned in § 1, n.l."
Id.
See id. at c.1559.
, Id. at c.1554: "Before witnesses are examined, their names are to be made known to the
parties; however, if in the prudent assessment of the judge, that cannot be done without
serious difficulty, it is to be done at least before the publication of the testimony." Id.
" Id.
46 Id. at c.1555: "With due regard for the prescription of can. 1550, a party can request that
a witness be excluded if a just cause for exclusion is demonstrated before the interrogation
of the witness according to law." Id.
41 1917 CODE

c.1763:

The parties must make known to each other the names of the witnesses before their
examination begins; if the judge prudently believes that this cannot be done without
great difficulty, the names of the witnesses must be made known by the parties to
each other at least before the publication of their testimony.
Id.
4" S. Congregatio de Disciplina Sacramentorum, Instructio Servanda A Tribunalibus Diocesanis In PertractandisCausis de Nullitate Matrimoniorum, August 15, 1936, in ACTA
APoSTOLICAE SEDIs 28, 313-361 (1936), commonly and herein cited as Provida Mater.
48 For example, to avoid serious dissension or to insure that the witnesses not be exposed or
subjected to some grave danger or serious inconvenience.
4' The inclusion of the procurator is significant. Ordinarily a proxy could not withhold information from the principal.
'0Provida Mater, art. 130, § 1: "If the necessity of avoiding serious dissensions demands it,
the instructor can bind the procurators and advocates under a special oath of secrecy lest
the witnesses be exposed to some grave danger." Id. For a further explanation of this, see W.
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witness to testify on condition that his name not be revealed to either or
both parties.5 1 Ordinarily, the actual testimony would later be divulged to
the parties at the time of publication. However, the basic principle here
established is that if essential testimony is obtained or induced under a
condition or promise of confidentiality, this condition or promise must be
honored assiduously from then on. So far, this addresses only the identity
of the witnesses. But that is an important issue in and of itself, since in
the revised Code the identity is ordinarily to be disclosed.
A further consideration worth noting is that if the judge had cause to
doubt the sincerity of an oath of secrecy taken by an advocate or procurator, he would treat them in the same way as he would treat the party,
namely, he would not reveal the identity of the witness. 3 This principle
was not articulated in the law itself, but was a sufficiently probable opinion and so it could be followed.53
The services of experts, court appointed or nominated by the parties
and approved by the court, may be used whenever the judge determines
that their skill or knowledge is required to prove something or to determine the true nature of a thing.' These experts are to have access to the
acts of the case, to documents and whatever else is necessary to permit
them to carry out their function correctly and faithfully. 5 Their work
may be viewed from two perspectives: 1) their evaluation is for the purpose of proving something; or 2) their evaluation is for the purpose of
assisting the judge in arriving at a conclusion as to the true nature of the
matter before the court. If the first view is taken, their report is no different from any other proof. On the other hand, the judge is not obliged to
DOHENY, CANONICAL PROCEDURE IN MATRIMONIAL CASES
after DOHENY).

244-246 (Milwaukee, 1938) (herein-

61 Provida Mater, art. 130 at § 2:

If a witness testifies only on the condition that his name not be revealed to either one
or both parties, and if the instructor thinks that this stipulation is well founded, he
has the right to delegate two or three people to whom the name of the witness is to be
given so that they may investigate the credibility and honesty of the witness, which
people are not to be interested in the case and must be above all suspicion as regards
the party or parties, insofar as this can be determined.

Id.
"' Actual violation of the oath would be sufficient cause to impose a fine or other penalty,
even deprivation of office. See 1917 CODE c.1625, § 3.
53 See Cappello, Quaestio Canonica, 19 PERIODICA 71-73 (1930) (hereinafter Quaestio).
8" 1983 CODE c.1574: "The services of experts must be used whenever their examination and
opinion, based on the laws of art or science, are required in order to establish some fact or
to clarify the true nature of something by reason of a prescription of the law or a judge." Id.
11 Id. at c.1577, § 2: "The acts of the case and other documents and aids which the expert
may need in order to function properly and faithfully must be turned over to the expert."
Id. 1983 CODE C.1581 provides: "The parties may designate private experts who must be
approved by the judge. . . . If the judge admits them, they may inspect the acts of the case
if necessary and be present at the discharging of the court experts' function ..
" Id.
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use the services of an expert,"" but may do so where he finds it useful or
necessary to assist him in sifting through the facts. In light of this, the
report of the expert may be viewed in the same way as the report of an
assessor, an assessor who is an expert in a particular field, and consequently available to no one but the judge.
The issue of confidentiality has arisen most urgently in connection
with the requirement that the acts be published."7 After the promulgation
of the American Procedural Norms (A.P.N.) and before the effective date
of the revised Code, it seems to have been a general practice among
American Tribunals to deny to both parties access to the acts of the case.
The reasoning was that Tribunals which lack the power of subpoena
would be unable, or at least find it very difficult, to obtain testimony unless witnesses could be assured that their responses would be held in confidence. Such a practice was justifiable both for practical considerations
and as a matter of law. But it is important, as a setting for considering
the revised Code, to understand that ecclesiastical law has always taken
the position that the parties should have access to the acts unless, in a
particular case, such access is to be restricted or denied. The principle is
openness, the exception is secrecy.
This may be seen clearly in the A.P.N. Norm 18, which states:
"when, after consultation with the Advocate and the Defender, the Judge
has decided that all necessary and available evidence has been obtained,
the principals will be permitted to read the Acts unless, in the opinion of
the Judge, there is danger of violation of the rights of privacy. The Judge
will consider the requests by the principals for further instruction before
bringing the case to a conclusion." So the revised Code does not articulate
a new concept in law, nor reestablish an old concept, long unused and
only now being revived, even though the reality of practice might seem to
be that secrecy is the norm and openness the exception. In short, in practice what had developed was that the current rule had become the exception, and the exception had become the rule.
Canon 1598 stipulates that once the proofs are gathered, the judge is
to permit the parties and their advocates, under pain of nullity, to inspect
the acts which have been kept secret from them up to that point. The
advocate may even request a copy of the acts. This right of access, however, is not entirely unrestricted. In the first place, the inspection site is
restricted to the office of the Tribunal. In the second place, in cases which
pertain to the public good,58 the judge may decide that in order to avoid
6 Id. at c.1680: "In cases of impotence or defect of consent due to mental illness, the judge

is to use the services of one or more experts unless it is obvious from the circumstances that
this would be useless ....
" See supra note 48.
57 See C.L.S.A., Proceedings 164 (Annual Convention 1980).
" Marriage cases pertain to the public good as distinct from the purely private good of
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the most grave danger, a particular part of the acts is to be shown to no
one, insuring always that the integrity of the right of defense is
maintained.59
This particular canon is very similar to two canons of the 1917 Code.
According to Canon 1858 of that Code, before the pleading and sentence
in a case, all proofs which still remained secret had to be published."
Publication involved granting to the parties and their advocates, permission to inspect the acts of the process."' These provisions were further
clarified by article 175 of Provida Mater, which specified that the presiding judge, by decree, was to grant to the parties and their advocates the
authority to examine the testimony and all the other proofs contained in
the acts which had been kept secret up to that time, and also permission
to request a copy of the acts. 2 Out of this background came Canon 1598
of the revised Code. So a review of the commentators on those canons of
the 1917 Code and the articles of Provida Mater is in order because it
provides insight for understanding the concept of publication and its relationship to the right of defense as found in the revised Code.
Oddly enough, a number of authors did little more than simply state
the canons of the 1917 Code or the provisions of Provida Mater, with
little or no commentary.0 3 Those who comment on them in any way are
agreed that the essential consideration is the right of defense. The inforindividuals.
1983 CODE c.1598, § 1:
After the proofs have been collected the judge by a decree must, under pain of nullity, permit the parties and their advocates to inspect at the tribunal chancery the
acts which are not yet known to them; a copy of the acts can also be given to the
advocates upon request; however, in cases concerned with the public good, in order to
avoid very serious dangers, the judge can decree that a given act is not to be shown to
anyone, with due concern, however, that the right of defense always remains intact.
1917 CODE c.1858: "Before the pleading and the sentence in a case, all proofs which have
been admitted into the acts of the case and which still remain secret must be published." Id.
61Id. at c.1859: "If permission was granted to the parties and their advocates to inspect the
acts of the process and to obtain copies of the same, the publication of the process is

thereby made." Id.
61 Provida Mater, art. 175:

1. After the proofs .thus far introduced by both sides have been duly considered by
the Defender of the Bond, by the judge instructor and by the presiding judge, the
communication of all the acts to both parties must take place.
2. This authorization is granted by a decree of the presiding judge in virtue of which
he grants the parties and their advocates the authority to examine the testimony and
all the other proofs that are in the acts and which have remained secret, as well as to
request a copy of the acts.
Id.
6" See W. DOHENY, supra note 50; Bottoms, The Discretionary Authority of the Ecclesiastical Judge in Matrimonial Trials of First Instance, Canon Law Studies § 349, at 145 (Catholic University of America 1955; D. PRUMMER, MANUALE IURIS CANONIcI 605 (Friburgi 1933).
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mation supporting or contradicting the petition must be available to the
parties so that they may put forward in the pleading stage an adequate
representation of their contentions. Wernz-Vidal explain, for example,
that the proofs cannot be impugned unless they are known."4 Augustine
sees it as giving the parties an opportunity to defend their positions. 6
66
Others merely speak of it as being necessary for the right of defense.
Most seem to be agreed that publication is necessary for validity, although the opinion is not unanimous. Augustine, on the other hand,
states that publication is not required for the validity of the trial.6 1 In the
legislation prior to the 1917 Code, it certainly was not a requirement for
validity, and, no doubt, this influenced the post-Code writers.66 But the
intent of the 1917 Code seemed to be that it be a requirement for
validity.6
Most authors take for granted that publication will be made. A number go so far as to state unequivocally that it is required for validity,70
and that its omission would cause nullity in the process, albeit remediable
nullity. 7' Wernz-Vidal even go so far as to say that, since it is of the substance of the process, the time period for submitting additional proofs or
pleadings does not begin to run until after all proofs are divulged. 7' The
general view of authors, therefore, seems to have been that publication
was an essential and substantial part of the process and was required so
6 See Wernz-Vidal, De processibus n.476 (hereinafter Wernz-Vidal).
65

C.

AUGUSTINE, A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW

VII 301 (N.Y. 1918)

(hereinafter Augustine).
" See Gaspari, Tractatus Canonicus de Matrimonio I 304 (Romae 1932); Veermersch &
Creusen, Epitome Iuris Canonici 11 107 (Romae 1949) (hereinafter Veermersch); Della

Rocca & Fitzgerald, Canonical Procedure 266 (Milwaukee 1961) (hereinafter Della Rocca);
Coronata (Mateo Conte), De processibus 294.
'7 Augustine, VIII, at 301.
" See Rotal decision January 28, 1918, A.A.S. 11, 24; see also Wanenmacher, Canonical
Evidence in MarriageCases, Canon Law Studies § 9, at 386 (Catholic University of America
1920) (hereinafter Wanenmacher).
69 See Wanenmacher, supra note 68, at 386-87. He is hesitant to declare publication absolutely necessary for validity. However, he says:
The publication of the acts is in justice due to the parties, but it does not clearly
appear whether its omission vitiates the proceedings and the sentence . . . The Code
seems to indicate that making an adversary acquainted with the other's proofs is so
necessary that its omission vitiates the proceedings.
Id.
20 See Della Rocca, supra note 66, at 266; Wernz-Vidal, supra note 64, at n.476.
71 See M. Cardinal Lega-Victorio Bartocetti, Commentarius in Judicia EcclesiasticaII, at
tit. xii (Romae 1939).
7" See Wernz-Vidal, supra note 64, at n.477. This is similar to the position taken by Franciscus Roberti in De processibus, vol. ii (Romae 1941). He points out that publication is a
necessary corollary to the fact that testimony is taken in secret. Id. at n.350. Without this
publication the case may not be concluded and, if it is concluded, it is null. Id. at n.435.
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as to maintain the integrity of the right to defense. Substantial omission
would, as a consequence, impair seriously a person's right of defense and
would nullify the proceeding.
It is important to understand this issue as it emerged in the postCode commentaries because it is so similar to the legislation of the 1983
Code. The restrictions or limitations these commentators see in the 1917
CODE must be considered in a review of the 1983 Code.
Despite its paramount importance, the right of the defense was always to be balanced against the welfare of the Church, the public good,
and even against the welfare of the individual in situations where full
publication might impair justice. The rule, therefore, was that publication
be effected, but always with the possibility of an exception based upon
the particular circumstances of the case.
Veermersch-Cruesen assert that publication could be omitted if it
would be seriously detrimental.1 3 Cappello strongly espoused a similar position. In responding to a question on publication, he held that the parties
not only may petition for a copy of the acts, but have a true right to this
so that the Ordinary or the judge cannot per se deny the petition for a
copy of the acts. To avoid difficulties with witnesses, the judge could bind
all concerned under an oath of secrecy according to the provision of section 3, Canon 1623, Code of 1917. However, if the party threatened to
make the acts known and the Ordinary or the judge prudently feared
damage from their divulgence and also feared that the party would not be
faithful to an oath of secrecy, the Ordinary or judge was not bound to
74
grant the petition for a copy of the acts.
There is no question about whether or not publication is necessary
for validity under the revised Code. Canon 1598 states that the proofs are
to be made available for inspection under pain of nullity. The remainder
of the canon is in line with the history and understanding of prior legislation, and must be understood in accordance with that legislation. Such an
approach is entirely in accord with standard approaches to interpreting
ecclesiastical law.
Accepting, then, the position that ecclesiastical law gives the parties
and their advocates a right to inspect the proofs which have been gathered and even goes so far as to give the advocates a right to petition for a
copy of the acts, the question must be asked: Are these absolute rights or
are there circumstances in which either or both may be restricted or even
denied completely without, thereby, invalidating the process?
73 Veermersch, supra note 66, at III, at 107. Delta Rocca speaks of the exceptional cases
where publication is not permitted. However, this has little bearing here since the reference
is to non-consummation cases and the Code of 1917 did not permit publication in such
cases. See 1917 CODE c.1985.
74 Quaestio, supra note 53, at 72-73.
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Considering first the right of the advocate to inspect or obtain a copy
of the acts, the only conclusion available is that it is not an absolute right
but one subject to restrictions. In accordance with previous legislation,
the judge could bind the advocate under an oath of secrecy not to reveal
to the party either the content of the testimony or even the name(s) of
the witness(es). This would be justifiable only when the judge has already
made a determination, in accordance with the remainder of Canon 1598,
that the information is to be withheld from the party. As Doheny explains: "It is the natural tendency of an attorney or advocate to keep his
client perfectly informed. '75 Where such a transmission of information
would effectively negate the value the judge is trying to preserve by
means of withholding information from the party, he would be justified in
binding the advocate under an oath of secrecy. Further action would be in
accord with the principles enunciated above regarding divulgence of the
identity of witnesses.
Regarding the right of the party to inspect the acts, Canon 1598 establishes a restriction as to place. The party has this right of inspection,
but only in the chancery of the Tribunal. Not only is the judge under no
obligation to permit the inspection elsewhere, but it seems he is not free
to do so. The second restriction evident in the canon is that the party has
no right even to petition for a copy of the acts, much less to obtain a copy
of them. The first phrase of the canon speaks only of inspection when it
includes both the party and the advocate. The second phrase speaks of a
right to petition for a copy of the acts, but mentions only the advocate
and is entirely silent about the party. It is reasonable to conclude that the
legislator did not intend to give the party a right.
Marriage cases always involve the public good, 6 so the latter portion
of the canon is applicable to them. The judge can determine, therefore,
that any particular act is not to be made available to anyone. This means
that the judge may exclude any or all items in the acts by this decision. It
also means a decision is to be made in regard to each individual item of
proof. Further, it clearly is the intent of the law to give the judge this
exclusionary power not only in regard to the parties, but also in regard to
the advocates. It goes without saying that what he could exclude from the
party he could also exclude from the procurator, since the latter, as a
proxy, is canonically identical to the party.
Such an action may be taken only to avoid the gravest danger. It is
the judge who makes the decision on whether this very grave danger is
present and whether the only means of avoiding it is restriction of the
right of access in whole or in part. In making his decision, he may be

75

70

W.

DOHENY, supra note 50, at 254.

1983

CODE

c.1691.
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guided by the provisions of Provida Mater and the commentaries
thereon.77 Consequently, the judge can take into account such individual
and particular considerations as that the witnesses might be subjected to
harassment or lawsuits; or he may take into account more general considerations such as lessening the likelihood that testimony will be available.
in future cases if anything is done to erode the trust people in general
have that information communicated to the Church, or to an official of
the Church, will be held in confidence. Again, the rule is that the party
and the advocate have the right of access to the proofs gathered, but not
an unrestricted right. A decision must be made in each individual case and within the individual case - about each individual item of proof.
But, in fact, that is not significantly different from what the previous law
required.
At the conclusion of the case in first instance, a sentence is drawn up
articulating the decision of the judge. Most tribunals have modeled their
sentences on those of the S.R. Rota so that the sentence contains a rather
extensive review of the testimony introduced.
Canon 1614 of the revised Code says that the sentence has no force
until it is published."" Canon 1615 then stipulates that publication is effected either by giving a copy of the sentence to the parties or their
procurators, or by transmitting a copy of it to them by the public postal
service or in another safe way7 9 Again, the right of defense is the main
consideration. A party who feels aggrieved by the decision of a judge has
the option of filing a complaint of nullity,80 if there is a ground of such
nullity present,8 or of interposing an appeal against the decision to a
11 Provida Mater is not abrogated in whole by the revised Code. Canon 20 of that Code
states the principle that prior legislation is abrogated or derogated only if such is expressly
established or if it is directly contrary to later legislation. Further, Canon 21 states that if
there is any doubt, the revocation of the prior legislation is not to be presumed but, insofar
as possible, the two are to be reconciled.
78 1983 CODE c.1614: "The sentence is to be published as soon as possible with an indication
of the ways in which it can be challenged; it has no force before publication even if the
dispositive section has been made known to the parties with the permission of the judge."
Id.
" Id. at c.1615: "The publication or announcement of the sentence can be made either by
giving a copy of the sentence to the parties or their procurators or by sending a copy to
them in accord with the norm of can. 1509." Id.
8OId. at c.1621: "The complaint of nullity mentioned in can. 1620 can always be proposed
by way of exception in perpetuity and by way of action before the judge who pronounced
the sentence within ten years from the date of publication of the sentence." Id. "The complaint of nullity in the cases mentioned in can. 1622 can be proposed within three months
from the notification of publication of the sentence." Id. at c.1623.
8' 1983 CODE c.1620 lists the various grounds on which a sentence might be irremediably
null. The most critical of these from the point of view of the subject here under consideration is § 7: "the right of defense was denied to one or other party.
Id. Canon 1622 lists
the grounds on which a sentence might be remediably null.
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higher court.8 2 Ordinarily, therefore, the entire sentence is to be communicated to the parties.
The Code makes provision for the situation where the sentence is not
communicated. Obviously, the proceeding in the first instance is concluded so it cannot become invalid. However, the period within which appeal may be lodged does not begin to run until publication is effected. 3
From the wording of Canon 1682, section 1, it seems the parties have the
option, even though not the strict right, of presenting their observations
on the sentence for consideration by the appellate court in its decision on
whether to confirm the first-instance decision or to remand it for trial in
the ordinary process at the second instance. That would presume an
awareness of the reasons on which the first-instance decision was based.
But the reasons do not necessarily have to include a detailed recounting
of the various proofs. Also, this may not be a major concern in a marriage
case since in such cases there is a mandatory review by a court of appeals
of all affirmative decisions.8 In fact, at the appellate level, the approach
is the same whether the case comes to the court as a matter of procedural
requirement, or whether there is also an appeal by one or other of the
parties.8 5 Action on an appeal would not be distinct or different from action taken on routine review.
There are two issues to be considered in arriving at a conclusion:
1. The information the sentence should contain. It would seem that
the sentence might consist in the required recital of identifying facts and
of the procedural acts which occurred, coupled with a very brief dispositive part. 88 The dispositive part of the sentence is the portion which rendered decision on the controversy. It is, therefore, a statement of the
judge's conclusion. The revised Code requires that this be preceded by
the reasons on which it is based. 87 That portion can be very brief and may
83 Id.

at c.1628: "The party who feels aggrieved by a given sentence and likewise the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond in cases in which their presence is required,
have the right to appeal from a sentence to a higher judge ...." Id.
" Id. at c.1634, § 2: "Meanwhile the judge from whom the appeal is being made must transmit the acts to the appellate judge ... " Id.
" Id. at c,1682, § 1: "The sentence which first declared the nullity of the marriage together
with the appeals if there are any and the other acts of the trial, are to be sent ex officio to
the appellate tribunal within twenty days from the publication of the sentence." Id.
8

Id. at § 2:

If the sentence rendered in favor of the nullity of marriage was in the first grade of
trial, the appellate tribunal by its own decree is to confirm the decision without delay
or admit the case to an ordinary examination of a new grade of trial, after considering
the observations of the defender of the bond and those of the parties if there are any.
Id.
" 1983 CODE c.1612 lists the identifying facts which must be included and the other formalities to be observed.
"' Id. at § 3: "Following these points is the dispositive section of the sentence preceded by
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consist in nothing more than a statement of the various conclusions arrived at by the judge from the proofs offered, without giving any extensive detail as to what individual witnesses might have said.
2. How the sentence is to be communicated. It seems a matter for the
discretion of the judge as to whether he orders publication by means of
handing a copy of the sentence to the parties or by transmitting a copy to
them. The 1917 Code offered three alternatives:
a. Summon the parties to the Tribunal to hear the sentence read by
the judge;
b. Notify the parties that the sentence is at the Tribunal and that
they have a right to read it and to petition for a copy of it; and
88
c. Send a copy of the sentence to the parties by the public mails.
In fact, most tribunals seem to have opted for the second alternative.
Since the judge has an alternative under Canon 1614 of the revised Code,
he could determine that publication be by means of handing the parties a
copy of the sentence. This would require that they be summoned to the
Tribunal to receive the copy. It would seem advisable to indicate to them,
in the same notice, the actual decision rendered.
Canon 1634, section 2, ordains that the time period within which appeal must be lodged does not begin to run until the party receives a copy
of the sentence. It could be argued that failure of the party to obey the
summons of the Tribunal to appear and receive a copy of the sentence is
an equivalent to forfeiting of the right of appeal. Further, the case will
receive the same kind of review at appellate level whether the party appeals or not. Consequently, a decision by the judge to hand the sentence
to the party rather than mail it would not, no matter how the circumstances might transpire, be a violation of any strict right.
Canon 1481, section 1 of the revised Code gives the Judge power to
appoint a Procurator, even for an unwilling party. If such an action is
taken in a particular case, the sentence may be communicated to the
Procurator, and this communication is sufficient to bring the sentence
into force under Canon 1614.
There is, of course, always the possibility that the party or parties
will appear at the Tribunal to receive a copy of the sentence. It is advisable, therefore, to insure the decision is written in such a way that it does
the reasons on which it is based." Id.

1917

CODE

c.1877:

The publication of a sentence can be done in three ways, either by summoning the
parties to hear the sentence solemnly read by the judge sitting in court, or by notifying the parties that the sentence is at the chancery of the court and giving them
permission to read it and to get copies of it, or, where such is the custom, by sending
a copy of the sentence by registered mail, in which case care must be taken to have
proof that the parties actually receive the sentence.
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not violate any of the concerns of confidentiality which might previously
have arisen in the particular case. If it is necessary to send further information to the appellate court, this may be done either by sending a
photo-copy of the entire acts, or some kind of summary of the testimony,
much like an assessor's report, as an addendum to but not a part of the
sentence.
CONCLUSIONS

The variety of records is extensive. The right of access to those
records varies according to the nature of the record and the relationship
to the record of the party who seeks or who is requested to exhibit it. It
would be difficult to provide an exhaustive list of documents or records
with an evaluation of the confidentiality of each. A partial such list, however, will demonstrate a method of approach to the question, taking into
account the principles mentioned previously.
Baptismal, marriage and death records are public ecclesiastical documents. They pertain to the status of a person in the Church. They are
generally accessible. However, they may also contain marginal notations
which form part of the official record in the true sense; for example, a
note that an individual is adopted, a note that a person was professed as
a religious and is now dispensed, a note that a marriage was declared null.
The provision of Canon 1548, section 2, number 2 would be applicable to
such records.
Records of ecclesiastical proceedings have to be considered under two
headings, depending on the type of proceeding. Records of criminal cases
are placed in the secret archives of the curia. They are accessible to no
one except the Ordinary. When the See is vacant, they are accessible to
the Administrator, but only in a limited manner. Records of other contentious cases, for example, marriage cases, are governed by a rule of confidentiality. No obligation of secrecy governs because a case was processed
and the final result reached. But the record of the case containing testimony and the like is accessible only to the parties, their advocates and
procurators and Tribunal officials, and then only in the circumstances
and in a manner defined in law and only for the purpose defined in law.
Upon completion of a case, they become entirely confidential and fall
under the rule of Canon 1548, section 2, number 2.
Personnel records on priests or religious could and probably would
contain public ecclesiastical documents, for example, a record of ordination or religious profession, or letters of appointment to particular ministries. As such they are accessible, certainly, to the individual on whom the
record exists. They could also contain other records or documents, for
example, educational transcripts, records or reports of health care treatment or therapy, letters of praise or complaint, and the like. These are
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not public ecclesiastical documents and do not become such merely by
being placed in an official file of an ecclesiastical institution. As merely
private documents, they are the sole property of the ecclesiastical authority in whose possession they are. The Code does not articulate a right of
access to them, even on the part of the individual on whom the record
exists. That individual, though, has a right to privacy in ecclesiastical law.
This right imposes an obligation on the ecclesiastical authority to hold
such a record under a seal of confidentiality. This obligation is akin to the
obligation incumbent on those mentioned in Canon 1548, section 2, note
1, namely, civil officials, doctors, obstetricians, advocates, notaries, and
those who are bound to professional secrecy. The individual on whom the
record exists could release the ecclesiastical authority from the obligation
of confidentiality in regard to all or part of the record, but, under the
provision of Canon 1546, section 1, cannot be obliged to do so.

